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Discontinuity of Law and Legal Security*
NicolasMolfessis °*
There exists, it would appear, a total incompatibility between
the two words that make up the title. Legal security, a basic
assumption, calls for continuity in the law. It banishes ruptures and
revolutions, the oversight of the past and all forms of abolition. It
condemns the loss of memory as much as the convulsive
movements of the law. Considered from that point of view, one
would not be surprised that it had been raised, by Roubier, to the
status of "first social value to reach," to the point that the author
could state that "where this essential value, legal security, has
disappeared, there is no longer any value which can remain; the very
word 'progress' becomes meaningless and even ridiculous, and the
worst injustices multiply with the disorder that settles in." Legal
security requires, before anything else, respect for past legal
situations. It is so fundamental that, without any doubt, it is the
foundation of the existence of a principle of continuity in the law
which persists "through the changing forms of the State."
Though it is the enemy of discontinuity, legal security does not,
by the same token, call for stagnation or steadfastness. Although it
seeks stability, it can also require change, whenever it becomes the
condition for adjusting the rule of law to the social, economic and
political circumstances. It calls also, therefore, for the progressive
movement of the law, but a movement that is measured and
controlled, a movement that illustrates, if not the hold of the law on
the time, at least its persistence beyond the convolutions of history
and events. In this respect, legal security is assuredly the basic
need. It makes up the first order of the law without which the
temporality of actions and behaviours is negated and erased in
defiance of any foreseeabiltiy.
Such a requirement could not remain on the level of the
principles of elementary natural justice. In the international order,
legal security has been upheld by the courts entrusted with
enforcing the respect of principles and rights of a value superior to
that of legislation. The European Court of Justice has stressed its
importance to the point of referring to it as "a fundamental
requirement," to which the ECJ added the principle of the
protection of "legitimate expectation and confidence," itself a
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guarantee of the respect for the stability of the rule. The ECJ did
see many effects in that rule.
In the internal order, the Conseil Constitutionnel (Constitutional
Council) was to follow quite logically the movement initiated at the
European level when, in its decision of December 16 1999, it
formally acknowledged "the aim of constitutional value to the
accessibility and understanding of the law."
Thus, legal security will appear to have many ramifications. It is
obvious that it carries with it effects that are as diverse as essential:
protection against the retroactivity ofthe rule oflaw, requirements of
clarity and precision in the expression of the law, respect of
commitments and promises or, still, confidence in the effectiveness
of the protection of public order, .... The requirement of security
in the law permeates relations governed by private law as well as
relations with positive law. It imposes itself on those who formulate
the rules as well as on those who apply them.
However, let us not be mistaken: a new principle has greater
chances of being recognized and to gain formal power, as the causes
for its violation of being multiplied. Thus, the principle of legal
security makes progress in positive law because the challenges to
principles have increased. Known tragedies prove the point:
inflation of statutes, poor legislative drafting, multiplication of
reversals ofjurisprudence, without forgetting the suffocation we are
experiencing under the plethora of information under which we are
all more and more buried. As a result, the rise of a principle of
security must first be understood as a reaction against the dysfunction
ofa legal system which is characteristic of our contemporary systems
and their 'bureaucratization.'
The article aims to establish that to promote the principle oflegal
security is to seriously question the French legal system itself. The
hypothesis is based on the fact that legal security goes against the
contemporay evolutions ofthe sources oflaw, a manifestation ofthe
disorders and dysfunctions of the law. The principle of legal security,
because it grows within a legal system that increasingly ignores the
requirements that it carries within itself, necessarily runs into a
conflict with the legal system and calls for its overthrow.
Consequently, a tension emerges between the evolution ofthe sources
of law and the aspirations that legal security calls for. The proof can
be found in the study of the instances of the lack of continuity in
legislation and in juriprudence. Among the various evolutions that
the rise of legal security brings about or is led to bring about, it
appears that the very position of the jurisprudence ought to be turned
on its head: the critical analysis of the instances of the courts'
reversing themselves and the insecurity that such reversals create
should indeed lead to the creation of a 'transitory or temporary law'

2003]

NICOLAS MOLFESSIS

1307

of such reversals. Should that happen, the jurisprudence would then
officially climb to the rank of source of law as it is in the common
law system.

